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8. Ghanaian churches in the Netherlands
Religion mediating a tense relationship
has constructed its own place in the Netherlands
without an extensive reliance on the public goods
of this society. In addition, the measures taken by
the Dutch government with regard to Ghanaian
immigration and the control and investigations
of Ghanaian identities – which extend into Ghana
itself – have recently been tightened.
This chapter explores the various dimensions
of this tense relationship. It pays specific atten-
tion to the many Ghanaian churches that have
emerged in the Netherlands and the role they
play in the creation of a notion of self-reliance
and self-esteem. There is some evidence to
suggest that religious structures in Ghana have a
history of antagonism with regard to state
policies. This feature seems to have been carried
over into the Netherlands. The Ghanaian church-
es escape overt attention by the Dutch govern-
ment, do not take part in the formal contacts
between the government and Ghanaian interest
groups and societies, and hardly take part in the
formal structures of Dutch religious life and its
various church bodies. The moral authority they
represent within the Ghanaian community is a
distinctive one.
The first section is devoted to aspects of the
Ghanaian immigration itself, while the second
section deals with the position of these churches
within the migrant community. What has been
the role of these churches with regard to Dutch
identity politics and present changes in its
policies?
Ghanaian immigration
Since the early 1970s a massive overseas migra-
tion has occurred of Ghanaians seeking ‘greener
pastures’ in Europe and the United States. This
migration occurred in two waves, starting around
1973 when Ghana experienced the effects of the
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For decades, Ghanaians have formed a substan-
tial immigrant community in the Netherlands,
but only since 2000 has the Ministry of Home
Affairs begun to consider the option of granting
Ghanaians the formal status of a ‘recognized
minority’. However trivial this issue might
appear in the eyes of the general public, it
nevertheless marks the start of a new episode for
Ghanaians living in the Netherlands. Whereas the
previous period was dominated by concerns over
(illegal) immigration of Ghanaians and the
faltering measures to control that influx, new
policies with regard to the major Dutch cities
(‘Grote Steden-beleid’) are causing a change in
perspective. It is now acknowledged that in
addition to the established, large minorities –
Chinese, Indonesian, Moroccan, Turkish and
Surinamese – other and generally much smaller
minorities have come to stay. As a recognized
minority, the immigrants concerned are entitled
to policy measures geared towards their specific
needs. Hence, we are witnessing a major shift
from control and exclusion to policies of inclusion
and care as far as the Ghanaian migrants’ predic-
ament is concerned.
Despite these shifts in policy, the tense
relationship between the Dutch state and the
Ghanaian community, specifically where the
Ghanaian identity documents are concerned, still
persists. Not only is Ghanaian life in the Nether-
lands generally marked by a high level of suspi-
cion with regard to the Dutch state, but the
migrant community itself has long taken over
certain functions that are otherwise provided by
the state. In a recent report, Nimako (2000) has
labelled this phenomenon ‘Emancipation by self-
reliance’ (‘Emancipatie op eigen kracht’). He
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oil crisis, followed by a new wave around 1981
when the coup by flight lieutenant Jerry John
Rawlings added political upheaval to a deepening
economic crisis. Migration initially focused on
the West African region itself, Nigeria in particu-
lar. When economic and political conditions
deteriorated, Ghanaian migration in the late
1970s started to focus on prosperous European
countries such as Britain, Germany and the
Netherlands. Sizeable communities of Ghanaian
migrants developed in London, Hamburg and
Amsterdam. In 1995 it was estimated that more
than 12 per cent of the entire Ghanaian popula-
tion was living abroad (Peil 1995: 345), and that
after cocoa and gold, migrant remittances had
become the third main source of income in Ghana.1
Over the years, Ghanaian politicians have been
aware that the Ghanaian diaspora is vital to
Ghana’s survival in the world economy of today.
The frequent visits by Ghanaian political leaders to
Ghanaian communities abroad have underscored
the importance of this economic umbilical cord.
The Ghanaian community in the Netherlands
comprises both first and second generation
migrants. In his recent report, Nimako (2000)
provides detailed data on the composition of the
community, and indicates that of the nearly
13,000 officially registered ‘ethnic’ Ghanaians
(1998), 22 per cent belong to the second genera-
tion, having been born in the Netherlands.
Moreover, 56 per cent of the first generation
migrants have adopted Dutch nationality. There-
fore, a total of 78 per cent of officially registered
Ghanaians have become fully ‘Dutch’ in terms of
their citizenship, as it is common that these
children born in the Netherlands are granted
Dutch nationality.
The Ghanaian community is quite young.
Migrants were and are mostly young men and
women, usually around their mid-twenties. Many
aspired to establish a family and therefore began
exploring ways of marrying partners from Ghana.
Young families settled from the early 1990s
onward and the second generation of Ghanaians,
born from Ghanaian parents in the Netherlands,
is therefore now in the age group up to about
nine years of age. With middle-aged or even older
Ghanaians numbering only a few, the Ghanaian
migrant community is young and dynamic,
marked by high labour productivity and eager to
‘make it’ in life. The rise of this energetic commu-
nity has caught the attention of scholars, stu-
dents and policy makers concerned with the
position of minorities in Dutch society. Of all the
Sub-Saharan African minorities, the Ghanaians
are by far the most researched and best de-
scribed. Reports deal with statistics, population,
coping strategies, home ties, religion, gender and
health, the colourful cultural expressions of the
Ghanaian community and its relative success in
overcoming the hardships of adaptation and
integration. The ‘Profile’, published by the
Ministry of Home Affairs in 2001, concludes that
Ghanaians by and large are well-integrated in the
Netherlands. Employment is not really an issue of
great concern as many Ghanaians even have
multiple jobs, impoverishment is not a haunting
problem, whereas the language barrier (many
speak only English and Twi) is only felt when
people wish to apply for higher ranking, qualified
jobs. There is a disparity between their overall
level of education in comparison with the
unskilled or semi-skilled jobs Ghanaians hold, but
because of their age many still see possibilities
for improvement by enhancement of their
language skills.
With a few noticeable exceptions, most of
these studies have difficulties in grappling with
the issue of illegal or undocumented immigra-
tion. Over the past two decades, the Dutch
government has developed policies to curb the
influx of what it perceived as mainly ‘undocu-
mented’ and therefore illegal labour migrants. In
a strange way the influx of illegal Ghanaian
migrants has coincided with the efforts by the
government to establish what Rouse has called a
taxonomic state:
an increasing use of censusing and mapping, the
growing emphasis on the registration of births,
marriages and deaths, the history of the pass-
port, the identity card and fingerprinting...(Rouse
1995: 362)
1. Personal communi-
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Dutch suspicions
Particularly towards the end of the 1980s and
early 1990s, Africa came to figure as a ‘force’
largely responsible for undercutting the taxo-
nomic efforts of the Dutch state, which had
developed various techniques to control access to
the common goods of its welfare society. In the
early 1980s the so-called SoFi-number was
introduced, a fiscal code given by the Dutch state
to every resident at the moment of birth. This
made it possible to keep a record of a person’s
income, tax-pay status, and use of social security
benefit schemes throughout their life. This
taxonomy was particularly meant to prevent
illegal access to the common goods of the Dutch
social benefit schemes.
One of the problems that surfaced, however,
was that records on the population, particularly
in the larger cities, showed many gaps. Identities
were not fully known, could not be fully tracked
or had escaped supervision. This came to be
known as ‘statistical dirt’ (‘vervuiling’) in the
population registration: records and statistics on
the nation-state’s subjects were not ‘clean’,
‘consistent’ and ‘compatible’. From the 1980s on,
a widely shared, public concern with ‘illegality’
(‘het illegalen-vraagstuk’) was born. Wild guesses
began circulating in Dutch politics with regard to
the total size of the illegal labour migrant
population and the extent of the ‘damage’ done
to the Dutch economy, labour market and the
social services apparatus.
As public alarm was growing about the
‘volume’ of illegal aliens, and premised on the
idea that one’s identity is inseparably tied to one
name and to one number, Dutch civil servants in
the big cities began complaining bitterly about
the strange identities, often considered ‘fraudu-
lent’, that were discovered in their records and
statistics. Since the late 1980s this concern has
focused predominantly on the documents
belonging to Ghanaians and Nigerians. When I
interviewed civil servants in The Hague they
revealed that in the years between 1992 and 1996
those dealing with Ghanaian and Nigerian
identity-documents would consider a priori
almost 100 per cent of these to be fraudulent,
forged or otherwise incorrect. The crash of the
Israeli plane into the Amsterdam Bijlmer area in
1992, causing over 40 deaths in a blazing fire,
stirred public concern about the possible size of
the Ghanaian population as numbers of them
went missing. Police officials initiated a public
debate about the numbers of illegal Ghanaians
supposedly living in such low-cost housing areas,
now assuming a link between the numbers of
illegal Ghanaians and the crime rate. In contrast
with other ethnic minorities in the Netherlands,
this provoked disproportionate concern for the
West African community on the part of Dutch
officials. It was soon estimated that the number
of ‘undocumented’ West Africans was likely to be
double if not triple the official figures (Van den
Broek 1992).
The Dutch government introduced laws
aimed at curtailing illegal immigration with the
hope of enhancing the state’s effectiveness in
supervising civil society. These laws sought to
prohibit contract marriages (‘Wet Schijnhuwe-
lijken’), thereby limiting the use of marriage as a
way of gaining entry into Dutch society. Another
law made it obligatory to be able to prove one’s
identity whenever asked at one’s place of work
(‘Wet Identificatieplicht’) and a law called the
‘Koppelingswet’ provided for the connecting of a
range of different databases which each contain
highly private, personal information on Dutch
residents. Through their interconnection, this
legislation will increase the visibility of those
who have thus far escaped through the loopholes
and inconsistencies of the various data systems,
finding ways to reside and work in the Nether-
lands on an illegal basis.
These laws were also introduced in order to
enable further research into the supposed
relationship between illegality and criminality
(Staring et al. 1998, Van der Leun 1998). In 1994 a
special parliamentary commission of enquiry was
established aimed at reviewing police methods of
investigating criminal organizations in the
Netherlands (the Van Traa parliamentary commis-
sion). An entire chapter of its report was devoted
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to the Nigerian and Ghanaian involvement in
criminal organizations and their intertwined
relations in such activities. Although criminal
activities among Ghanaians and Nigerians appear
to be limited to a few domains (drug trafficking,
car theft and trafficking in women for the
prostitution business), these activities involved
the supplying of identity papers and other
documents (a type of activity known as ‘making
papers’) for which they have become particularly
well known. It is because of the taxonomic nature
of the Dutch state that this activity was perceived
as undermining its very basis. In other words,
fraudulence with documents now began to be
regarded as a serious crime.
This trend culminated in 1996 with the
publication of yet another government ruling
that came to be known as the ‘Probleemlanden
circulaire’ (the circular letter on problem coun-
tries, April, 1996). This circular blacklisted five
countries as having a notorious record concern-
ing the production of fraudulent identity docu-
ments. At the top of this list was Ghana followed
by Nigeria, India, Pakistan and the Dominican
Republic.
For the first time, the Dutch government
stated that it had no confidence in the capability
of these five governments to control the flow and
authenticity of identity documents. On top of the
normal procedures related to migration and
documents, another instrument would be added
to controlling and checking identities. This
instrument is called ‘verification’ (‘verificatie’). It
basically implies that for any identity document
required of Ghanaians and Nigerians in the
Netherlands (passport, marriage certificate, birth
certificate, etc.), the Dutch government is entitled
to investigate the person’s identity in the country
of origin. In practice it meant that as of 1996 the
Dutch embassies in both countries stepped up
their investigation of antecedents of any person
applying for visa or residence permits, or for the
adoption of the Dutch nationality. Such investiga-
tions carried out by Dutch officials in Ghana,
usually with the help of local informants and
detectives, involve the interrogation of relatives,
friends and colleagues, and researching schools,
churches and hospitals for any further bit of
information on the person. Only after the full
verification of the person’s identity is completed
can documents be assessed and stamped as being
‘verified’. In other word, any Ghanaian person
hoping to settle in the Netherlands or anticipat-
ing to marry within the Netherlands knows in
advance that permission to do so will only be
obtained after a full and costly investigation of
his or her private life in the country of origin.
Enormous difficulties with this verification
procedure have arisen. Many Ghanaians have
complained about the fact that in Ghana birth
records are often missing or simply non-existent,
that names are spelled differently or have been
changed during the course of one’s life, that
dates and places of birth, of residence, of mar-
riage, etc., are often not recorded, and that
schools, churches and hospitals often have lost
their records due to lack of funds for proper
storage. Some have also indicated that families
are often divided among themselves due to
conflicts and rivalries, resulting in an unwilling-
ness to give information or in deliberate distor-
tions. It has even been suggested that local
detectives have been bribed to give details or to
mislead the investigation and so on.
A blow to Ghanaian dignity
The impact of this procedure on the Ghanaian
migrant community has been devastating. Many
of the migrants had hoped to be able to marry
prospective partners in Ghana and bring their
spouses to the Netherlands, a trajectory which
has now become virtually impossible as all sorts
of ‘verified’ documents are requested which have
proven to be very hard to come by (birth, mar-
riage or bachelor certificates). The questioning by
local detectives of relatives, friends, church
leaders and others about personal identities has
become a nightmare as it gives way to confusion,
dealings, intimidation, family rivalries, suspicion
and so forth. Monies paid for documents for the
services of local civil servants often vanish. The
latest verification questionnaire that any Ghana-
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ian applicant has to fill out now contains over
25 question sections that relate even to uncles,
aunts, half-brothers, half-sisters and grandpar-
ents back home in Ghana, a task almost impossi-
ble to complete and an interference with private
life spheres that Ghanaians consider completely
inappropriate in cultural terms.
When the effects of the verification procedure
became felt, Ghanaian interest groups presented
a petition to the Dutch parliament in 1998
including reports on a number of cases in which,
for unclear reasons, verification had failed. The
report, although supported by legal rights groups
and lawyers in the Netherlands, effected little
change in the situation. In 1999 this was fol-
lowed by an official complaint filed with the
Ghanaian government against the Dutch govern-
ment and their treatment of such and similar
cases. While interest groups in the Netherlands
began organizing their collaborative protests
against these measures, in Accra the prizes for
forged documents were skyrocketing (for Accra
see De Thouars 1999). So-called ‘paper-boys’ and
‘connection-men’ increased their prices for forged
passports, visas or any other type of required
documents to unprecedented levels.
Within the Ghanaian community these
measures were increasingly being felt as insult-
ing and as a new feature of late postcolonial and
highly unequal state relations. The Netherlands’
authorities’ investigations of citizens’ identities
on the territory of another state is a telling sign
of this inequality and was felt as a blow to
Ghanaian dignity and self-esteem. Ghana’s and
Nigeria’s weaker systems of civil administration,
both in the present and in the past, act in that
sense against their own territorial integrity. They
have been forced to allow investigations of the
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The Ghanaian church
community Resurrec-
tion Power and Living
Bread Ministries in the
Egeldonk car park in
Amsterdam.
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identities of their citizens by another, more
strongly organized state. From the perspective of
Dutch officials, this entire exercise is a reaction to
the failure of previous attempts to tighten access.
The Dutch state wants to supervise the state’s
perimeters and to curb migration from Africa
(and the rest of the non-Western world for that
matter). Economic migrants are considered
parasitic to its wealth and resources. West
African immigration in particular sent shock
waves through the Dutch system, demonstrating
that access control was far from watertight. The
porous system offered many loopholes for taking
up illegal residence and gaining illegal access to
social benefit schemes and the like. Above all,
many began to realize that a system based on the
creation of external memory for the identification
of persons, in terms of a paper-based bureau-
cratic control of identity as opposed to a social
memory of such identities, is the result of a
specific and certainly not universal cultural
rationale. It is particularly in West Africa (though
not exclusively so), where the social memory of
names and identities is so important, that the
confrontation between cultural rationales in
establishing identities became so pertinent.
It is in the context of this tightening of
immigration laws that the number of Ghanaian
Pentecostal churches in the Netherlands rapidly
began to increase. Although this growth at first
sight could be interpreted as coincidental, the
question arises how these churches have helped
to mitigate the impact of Dutch identity politics
on the Ghanaian community.
Ghanaian Pentecostalism and the
quest for respect and self-esteem
While Ghanaian identity in the Netherlands
began to be criminalized during the late 1980s,
various Ghanaian migrant communities wit-
nessed the emergence and proliferation of many
Pentecostal churches. Elsewhere I have described
the interplay between migration from Ghana and
the growth of Pentecostalism, as one of the most
popular forms of Christianity in Ghana (Van Dijk
2000, 2001).
The Ghanaian Pentecostal churches that then
emerged, particularly in the big cities, were
either branches of similar churches in Ghana or
newly established within the migrant community
itself. A more recent development is the ‘re-
migration’ of these churches from the Nether-
lands back to Ghana.
Pentecostalism is a brand of revivalist Christi-
anity with profound roots in black American
communities. From the United States, this faith
started spreading to other parts of the world
around 1910-1920. It is marked by charismatic
inspiration through the Holy Spirit, by which
ecstasy, speaking in tongues and various forms
of faith healing become available to the believer.
It is also distinguished by its emphasis on strict
moral codes and its ideologies relating to the
material well being of its members, sometimes
mockingly called the ‘prosperity gospel’. Much
more should also be said about the personalism
surrounding the leader-founders of the vast
number of churches, the sense of individualism
that they propagate and the critical attitudes
they adopt vis-à-vis various forms of traditional
cultural life. As many authors have argued,
Pentecostalism is very much a faith within
modernity, and much of its present appeal in
African countries such as Ghana can be under-
stood on that basis.
In Ghana this popularity has acquired unprec-
edented proportions. Particularly in the urban
centres many young, upwardly mobile urbanites
are fascinated by the Pentecostalists, who are
highly visible and audible in the public domain.
They are particularly successful in accessing or
controlling the media and thus are able to make
their (moral) messages heard in practically every
corner of society. This message propounds the
establishment of a Christian nation and a morally
rejuvenated society. While the churches on the
one hand provide prayer services for the spiritual
benevolence and the success and prosperity of
every individual believer, they also provide a new
idiom of power on a higher level of social and
political life. Central concerns are how Africa –
and Ghana in particular – can earn a respected
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place in today’s world community, and how
dignity, pride and self-esteem can be re-estab-
lished by getting rid of all evil and ancestral
relations that tie the country to its past. The
state is morally untrustworthy and politics a
matter of great spiritual danger, whereas the
nation must be liberated from the evil authorities
that rule it. While the old and established
missionary churches are condemned as preaching
a gospel that teaches that there is bliss in being
poor, most Pentecostal churches pursue (reli-
gious) entrepreneurship and urge their members
to dress according to the latest fashions and
styles. Displays of prosperity are welcomed as
signs that God is with those who are economi-
cally active and independent. In Ghana, member-
ship in the Pentecostal churches therefore
comprises primarily the emergent middle classes,
whose wealth is demonstrated through enor-
mous donations of money. The services provided
by these churches, such as marriages, funerals
and birthing rituals, have turned into matters of
prestige. It is in these Christianized rituals that
the ‘old’ society and its traditional customs can
be left behind and an embarrassing past of
ancestor worship, ‘superstition’ and ‘ignorance’
can be critically engaged.
A church such as the large Church of Pente-
cost International has established congregations
in over 40 countries around the world. As a
consequence of the trans-nationalization of
Pentecostalism there are now over 40 different
Ghanaian Pentecostal churches in the Nether-
lands. While these churches often have thou-
sands of members in Ghana, here in the Nether-
lands and elsewhere in Europe membership
usually numbers somewhere between 250 to 500
adults. Many of these churches relate as closely
to African cosmological notions as their predeces-
sors do in Ghana. This means that concepts of
spiritual protection, healing and deliverance from
evil are considered as important for the true
Ghanaian Pentecostal believer in the Netherlands
as they are back home in Ghana.
This principle also applies to the issue of
Ghanaian dignity and self-esteem in a globalizing
world. For a long time, the Ghanaian migrant
community did not have organizations that
would be able to make statements about the
moral life of the community. Neither did it have
clear-cut forms of social authority that could
‘rescue’ (as one informant explained to me) or
safeguard dignity, respect and self-esteem in
times of culturally important life-crisis rituals.
Of particular relevance are the elaborate funeral
arrangements. If these rituals are not observed
properly, the social prestige and esteem of an
entire family might be jeopardized. The Dutch
government could not fill this void, while during
the 1980s the small and emergent interest groups
such as RECOGIN or Sikaman were not in a
position to take up these roles. In other words,
there was a need for moral authority, for a
system and a setting that could preserve com-
mon notions of dignity, both with regard to the
situation in the host society as well as with
regard to the Ghanaians’ ‘own’ cultural norms
and feelings. Most Ghanaian migrants had been
forced to accept menial work, ranging from fish-
processing to cleaning jobs. These types of jobs
are often held in contempt by Dutch citizens, but
they are also looked down on by the emergent
middle class groups for whom Pentecostalism
holds an appeal. The stiffening Dutch identity
policies that occasionally resulted in police
‘razzias’, as they were called, only aggravated the
dominant feelings of loss, embarrassment and
social shame (most particularly in cases where
arrest by the police resulted in deportation back
to Ghana, which often led to a humiliating
confrontation with the family). The verification
procedures only served to worsen this situation.
These intrusions into the private life of the
applicant demonstrated that any outside power
could reach into the very heart of family life, of
kinship relations and such sensitive issues as
marriages, birth and citizenship in even the most
remote places in Ghana, and that nothing could
be done about it. All these developments ran
counter to a deeply felt sentiment that migration
must create respected ‘big men’ and ‘big mad-
ams’: people who had been able to ‘make it in the
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West’, who had earned the social esteem of being
able to build a ‘mansion’ in one of the suburbs of
Accra or Kumasi and who would therefore have
every right to claim a prominent place with his
or her kinship relations.
The unprecedented growth of the Pentecostal
churches in terms of numbers and membership
coincided with these developments. The churches
took on crucial roles with regard to the arrange-
ment of funerals and marriages, and provided
reliable channels of communication with Ghana –
an important service in view of all the enquiries
that Dutch officials wanted to make about
identities. Even more important, however, was
the atmosphere of prestige, pride and self-esteem
offered by these churches. Ostentation became
part of the church meetings, fashion and style
became crucial elements of the outfit of the true
believer and monetary donations the reciprocal
wheel that kept the community going as a way of
self-help and as a mode for displaying success
and prosperity. Furthermore, the churches filled
many functions and positions of authority in one
form or the other (prayer leader, choir leader,
president of men’s, women’s, youth fellowships,
masters of ceremonies, chair of funeral fund and
so on) so that ample channels of social esteem
were created.
In short, what Ghanaian men and women
lacked in the outside world is being created
inside the church community. In this new moral
order no questions are asked concerning a
person’s identity in taxonomic terms – that is,
a person as a ‘state-constructed’ individual.
Instead, questions are asked concerning an
individual’s moral standing in life, which is
largely determined by his or her spiritual
strength and social behaviour. In ‘saving one’s
soul’, the person is not cut off from his or her
social environment. In Pentecostal ritual the
person is regarded as the product of that family
and community. It is that community which
needs Christianizing to purge it from any evil
influences. The Pentecostal churches thus replace
the ancestral community with a new one, one in
which the church leader often takes the position
as the new ‘abusua panyin’, the family head, who
at all times is responsible for the proper execu-
tion of marriage, funeral or other important
rituals. Whereas the Dutch state is utterly
untrustworthy and Dutch society is held in
contempt because of its permissiveness in moral
terms, the churches have vied to establish a kind
of community where aspirations for respect,
esteem and authority have found an expression.
Sadly, it has to be noted that some of these
churches themselves have become embroiled in
internal leadership struggles that sometimes
have led to a breakdown in trust and to splits in
communities and congregations.
Since the turn of the century, the churches have
begun to face competition from associations
formed on an ethnic basis, the so-called ‘kuos’.
These ethnic associations provide another,
although much more restricted setting, where
the identity politics of the Dutch state are
mitigated and issues of respect and esteem are
lived out in a different way. These associations
establish kings (‘ohene’) and queen-mothers
(‘ohem maa’) as the symbolic carriers of an
identity that resists being encapsulated by the
state. Although in this sense they occupy a
position similar to that of the Pentecostal
churches, they have a limited role to play when it
comes to the life-crisis domains such as birth,
death and marriage. It is therefore to be expected
that the moral authority assumed by the Pente-
costal churches will for the time being remain
significant as a counterpoint to any other
authority Ghanaians happen to meet while living
in the diaspora.
 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the changing
policies of the Dutch government vis-à-vis
immigrant minorities. While previously the
Ghanaian minority was primarily the concern of
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Justice, now
the Ministry of Home Affairs seems to haven
taken an interest in enhancing the position of
‘small minorities’. The Dutch state has come to
realize that these minorities have come to stay
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and that therefore attention needs to be focused
on the make-up of the local multicultural social
fabric in the big cities. These policies, however,
are likely to be handicapped by a lack of under-
standing of the cultural, moral and religious
idiom used by this community in positioning
itself within Dutch society.
State policies are caught in a contradiction.
While aspiring to promote the integration of the
Ghanaian minority, the state’s taxonomic identity
politics run counter to these efforts. As a result,
the Ghanaian community remains suspicious of
the state altogether. Cultural and moral forms of
authority have emerged within the community,
manifested notably by the Pentecostal churches,
which in the eyes of the Dutch state cannot act
as its interlocutor. Dutch policies are guided by
the principle of strict separation of church and
state. Despite the Pentecostal churches’ moral
authority, they can therefore not be ‘targeted’ as
the facilitators of ‘integration’. The role of these
churches as mediators in the tense relationship
created by the Dutch state through its identity
politics, and as actors in carving out a profitable
place for the Ghanaian community as whole, has
been insufficiently recognized. The Pentecostal
churches deserve full recognition for their role in
helping Ghanaians overcome some of the effects
of this tense relationship by preserving a sense of
prestige and moral status on their own terms.
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